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Abstract 
Inter-firm collaboration and networking have significantly increased in the context of technological innovation, 
changing the business environment and contributing to rapid and global integration. Being at the heart of 
technological innovation and commercialization, the venture capital (VC) industry has adopted inter-firm 
alliance as a common practice on a global scale. The most common form of collaboration in the industry is 
investment syndication between firms which eventually leads to a network of syndication. Understanding drivers 
of syndication and its financial implications is no longer enough. The nature of the inter-firm collaboration 
networks can be influenced by location and industry characteristics, and in turn they can also influence the 
industry practices and change. This study investigates the emerging structure of the VC networks in technology 
ventures in Australia in order to capture key features of the Australian VC market. Using graph theory the paper 
presents syndication network graphs and analyses their structural properties. The connectivity and density 
analysis shows further scope for facilitating the flow of information and resources across the VC industry. 
Behavioural implications of the networks on the industry practices and viability are also analysed and questions 
raised about the VC industry’s contribution to supporting and mainsteaming sustainable technologies.  
Keywords: syndication network, inter-firm collaboration, industry culture, sustainability  
1. Introduction 
There is a growing evidence around the world of inter-firm networks across manufacturing, service and financial 
industries, especially in the venture capital (VC) segment of the financial industry (Sydow et al., 1997; Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Hopp & Reider, 2011; Terjesen, Patel, Fiet, & D’Souza, 2013). Collaboration among 
competing firms within the industry has emerged as a source of information and resource accumulation as well as 
a competitive advantage (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Baraldi, Gressetvold, & Harrison, 
2012; Gu & Lu, 2014). Since the 1980s, this has been particularly accelerated by the rapid technological 
innovation and commercialization on a global scale which has changed the market frontiers and nature of 
competition. It is therefore not surprising that researchers have taken a serious interest in the nature and 
implications of inter-firm collaboration.  
However, the nature of inter-firm collaboration is influenced by industry characteristics, such as core business, 
resources requirement, investment risk, market competition as well as the industry’s location which provides the 
economic, legal and social context for its activities. The VC industry has not only been at the centre of the 
commercialization of innovation and productivity growth around the world but also at the heart of 
entrepreneurial finance and financial innovation. Investing in the equities of young and promising technology 
ventures, managing and growing them to eventually divest the equity holdings at a higher price is the core 
business of the VC firms which requires industry expertise and also involves a high risk of failure. In response to 
the unique requirements of the industry’s core business, the VC firms have developed their own pattern of 
inter-firm alliance and collaboration which usually takes the form of equity syndication. Consequently, this 
results in the formation of syndication networks connecting the firms through the syndicated ventures. The 
structure and characteristics of the network then represent the industry as well as the macroeconomic context 
within which it is located.  
Against this background, we investigate the emerging pattern of syndication networks in Australia since the 
commencement of the country’s VC industry in 1984 when the Management & Investment Companies (MIC) 
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Program was launched by the government as an integral part of its industrialization strategy (Forsaith, 1993). The 
emerging structure of the network has some characteristics unique to Australia, although analytical insights from 
similar studies elsewhere (Bygrave, 1988; Sorenson & Stuart 2001; Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007; Zhang, Feng, 
Zhu, & Stanley, 2015; Jin, Zhang, & Li, 2016) are also informative. We also use the literature on inter-firm 
alliance to further understand the Australian syndication network and its behavioural implications, especially on 
the industry’s viability which emerged as a significant issue because of the vulnerabilities experienced during the 
global financial crisis (GFC) as well as the industry’s growing exposure to the emerging environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) risks and opportunities. 
Therefore the research not only investigates the structural properties of the VC industry networks with reference 
to Australia, but also makes a general contribution towards understanding the behavioural implications of the 
industry network in terms of an integrated platform for standardization and changes of industry practices. The 
VC sector is increasingly proving to be a vehicle supporting innovation and new technologies in relatively risky 
ventures as has been the case with information and computer technologies and biotechnology. More recently, VC 
firms are expected to explore and assist with opportunities related to climate change and the natural environment, 
such as renewable energy, nanotechnology, water supply and treatment. With the need to mainstream 
sustainability in order to achieve fast reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, fair use of resources and 
environmental conservation, there are high expectations that the entire financial sector, including venture capital, 
will develop mechanisms and tools to support these new classes of technologies. Individually and collectively 
through their networks, they have to respond to external environmental and social pressures and embrace 
forthcoming risks and challenges (Christofi, Christofi, & Sisaye, 2012). 
The subsequent sections of the paper include a literature review which identifies research gaps and establishes 
the significance and the rationale of the study. This is followed by the empirical investigation in which we use 
co-investment syndication as a tangible and measurable form of inter-firm alliance in the VC industry and graph 
theory to present and analyze venture capital investments. In the data and methodology section, the analytical 
boundary of the study is defined and the relevant VC investment data for Australia to be used in the structural 
analysis of the collaboration networks are described. Questions related to VC industry’s contribution to 
sustainability are raised. Finally, the last section of the paper links this analysis with the greater collaboration 
networks among industries, communities and government on the basis of the structural properties of the 
Australian VC networks which have not been previously explored. 
2. Literature Review 
An extensive multidisciplinary literature on strategic alliances and inter-firm collaboration has emerged in the 
1990s especially enriched by the initiative of organizational theorists’ quest for understanding socio-behavioural 
theories and developing insights into organizational behaviour and performances (Dennis, 2000; Stuart, 1998). 
We utilize insights from this literature to identify gaps in the existing research on VC syndication networks, 
especially in terms of understanding the behavioural implications of the structural properties of inter-firm 
collaboration networks which not only integrate the industry but also provide a social platform for cultural 
changes. The literature on inter-firm collaboration and alliance has investigated various firm-level issues, such as 
drivers of inter-firm alliance, implications on the firm’s performance, contractual and managerial matters. 
Network resources, including information, technology, know-how and skill, are similar to financial and social 
capital (Scott & Davis, 2003; Alexy, Block, Sandner, & Ter Wal, 2012; Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon, 2014) and 
influence the firms’ activities and business orientation.  
Researchers have used a range of theoretical premises, such as resource based management, resource dependence 
and exchange models, transaction cost theory and social exchange theories, to explain different aspects of the 
inter-firm alliance strategies (Tsang, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998; Anderson, 1995; Young-Ybarra 
& Wiersema, 1999). It has been suggested that there is a comparative advantage in simultaneous competition and 
cooperation between firms (Lado et al., 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998). The network of firms can also create a 
unique pool of resources which are inimitable and unreplaceable and thereby can be a source of long-term 
competitive advantage for the participats (Goerzen, 2007). These resources embedded in a rich social network 
can shape the opportunity set perceived by the firms. The network facilitates and enables firm exchange using 
social mechanisms (Gulati, 1999; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). In a different way, it can then challenge the 
traditional boundaries of the organizations providing a unique source of competitive advantage as well as an 
extended strategic space (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). The networks serve as a platform for knowledge 
transfer, although some alliances might lead to undesirable outcomes and dilute the competitive advantage (Mohr 
& Sengupta, 2002; Knights, Murray, & Willmott, 1993).  
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Collaboration and networking among competing firms can take several forms, both informal and formal. 
Informal networking can take place in various social and professional events, such as seminars and conferences. 
The formalization of networks can lead to the formation of professional and industry associations. As there is no 
prescribed sequence for the formal and informal ways of networking to occur, they can happen simultaneously 
on multiple platforms. Any formal collaboration may lead to joint financing arrangements which can either be a 
non-equity or equity alliance (Das & Teng, 1996; Teece, 1992). The prevalent form of equity alliance among VC 
firms takes the form of co-investment syndication where two or more VC firms either invest together at the same 
time in a company to form a syndicate or one firm invests first and then invites other VC firms in subsequent 
rounds of investment (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002).  
In the co-investment syndicates, the two or more VC firms investing together in a venture are represented on the 
company’s board and are making joint decisions about its future. Thus, syndication brings VC firms together 
through board representation and shared objectives (Noyes, Brush, Hatten, & Smith‐Doerr, 2014). The syndicates 
eventually become units or nodes of the syndication network of the VC firms. As the VC firms can co-invest in 
multiple ventures with the same or different set of investors, connecting multiples nodes eventually forms the 
industry networks. The co-investment syndicates in the portfolio companies represent nodes of the network and it 
commences to be formed at the node. Further nodes within the network may also be facilitated through 
syndicates.  
It has been argued that equity alliance is important for controlling relational risk in a changing competitive 
environment and integrated market space (Das & Teng, 1996) and inter-firm strategic alliances are routine in the 
hi-tech sector in order to facilitate organizational learning, innovation and growth as well as improve corporate 
reputation (Stuart et al., 1999). The process of technological innovation and entrepreneurship is often supported 
by coherent institutional innovations in the financial market, especially the VC industry, and the decision to 
invest in a young and innovative enterprise with little or no revenue track record is associated with high level of 
uncertainty (Tayebjee & Bruno, 1984; Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Furthermore, as the young ventures mature 
they often require diverse resources, specialized skills and knowledge which could often be provided better by a 
pool of VC firms as opposed to one firm. In response to the industry risk environment and resource requirements 
during the pre- and post-investment phase, inter-firm co-investment syndication has emerged as a regular form of 
collaboration (Gompers, 1995). The VC literature therefore often explores the question as to why VC firms 
syndicate and whether this makes any difference to their financial performance.  
Bygrave (1987) in his pioneering work on syndication behaviour suggested that the VC firms syndicate to 
address the uncertainty associated with investment and to access deal information, specialized knowledge and 
resources which can add value to the portfolio. Lerner (1994) emphasized that information sharing and obtaining 
a valid second opinion from another experienced VC firm in venture selection can drive syndication. Shane & 
Cable (2002) similarly suggest that peer reference in the investor network plays a vital role in the venture 
selection. Sharing experience, gathering information in the investment decision and reciprocating deals have also 
been emphasized as important (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007; Hopp & Lukas, 2014, Gu & Lu, 2014). 
Bygrave (1987), Locket & Wright (2001), Baraldi et al. (2012) used the resource exchange model and resource 
based view of firms to explain the syndication decisions. They point out that either pre-investment venture 
selection or the post-investment value creation can drive the syndication decision. De Clarcq & Dimov (2004), 
Manigart et al. (2006) among others argued that syndication is motivated by both investment risk reduction and 
portfolio risk diversification. However, VC firms can syndicate for more than one reason and research identified 
both venture selection and value added as motives for syndication (Hopp & Rieder, 2011).  
The factors which motivate syndication also encourage syndication networking as a natural extension. These 
syndication networks gradually connect VC investors through current and past co-investments and board 
representations in the shared portfolio companies in a web of relationships (Hochberg et al., 2007). Each venture 
capitalist would have their individual team of head-hunters, auditors, lawyers, underwriters, investment bankers 
to support the portfolio companies (Sahlman, 1990). The network members then get to share information, referral 
and opinion about future deals which help in developing long-term relationships leading to deal reciprocations 
and identification of future co-investors (Bygrave, 1988; Gompers, 1995; Stuart, 1998; Hop & Lukas, 2013). 
Previous research on the impact syndication networks have on the VC firm performances and results often shows 
positive links measured in terms of successful exit of the portfolio companies as well as internal rate of return on 
investment (Jääskeläinen, 2012; Guo & Jiang, 2013). It has been found that syndication can lead to better return 
and higher shareholder value (Brander et al., 2002; Lehman, 2006; Hochberg et al., 2007; Baraldi et al., 2012) 
and the network position of VC firms can also enhance their portfolio performance (Hochberg et al., 2007; Abel 
& Nisar, 2007; Checkley, Steglich, Angwin, & Endersby, 2014).  
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The structural properties of the firms’ networks, such as level and duration of interactions, are influenced by the 
structure of the industry (Sydow, Van Well, & Windeler, 1997). These networks defuse information which is both 
sector and location specific and can be a driver in market integration and expansion (Stuart et al., 1999; Kogut et 
al., 2007). In other words, the structural properties of the VC networks as well as their implication can often be 
country and industry specific. There have been studies of VC firm network structures highlighting their 
properties first in the US (Bygrave, 1988; Kogut et al., 2007) and more recently in Asia (Zhang et al., 2015; Jin et 
al., 2016). The Australian VC co-investment networks in technology related sectors however have not attracted 
research interest until now and this study aims to analyse their structural properties.  
Furthermore, the literature on inter-firm alliances recognizes the relational, reputational and social aspects with 
long-term implications, whereas VC research primarily focuses on financial performances. Nonetheless, the 
existing VC literature suggests that the venture capitalists who are well-networked, reputable and experienced 
seem to enjoy a more influential position in the networks (Lerner, 1994; Gu & Lu, 2014). Terjesen et al. (2013) 
also argue that normative rationality rooted in the norms and tradition plays a part in the co-investor selection 
process. In this paper, we analyse the behavioural and non-financial implications of co-investment networks in 
relation to governance and culture implications of the VC networks, especially on the industry’s viability and 
potential contribution to sustainability priorities. This analysis complements previous research on the implication 
of networks on financial performance.  
3. Data and Methodology  
This section describes how the current study was conducted, including the nature of the information source used 
and the adopted methodology for the analysis of the data. The aim is to describe the developments in the 
Australian VC industry and its preparedness to respond to current expectations and the need for technological 
changes. 
3.1 Data  
In order to analyse the VC firms’ co-investment networks in Australia we use the history of venture capital 
investment in portfolio companies from 1984 to 2008. This timeframe covers the first 25 years of existence of 
this industry in Australia since its emergence through government encouragement in 1984. We use the Thomson 
Reuters’ VentureXpert dataset (Venture Economics, 2009) as information source. The relevant data at a company 
level include VC investment dates and amounts as well as venture stage and investment industry. At the level of 
the VC firm, profile information including firm size and investment preferences is also available and extracted. 
The dataset classifies all companies in three broad industry categories, namely information and communication 
technology (ICT), biotechnology, medical and healthcare (BMH) and other non-high-tech sectors. Since VC in 
essence is the development capital for technology ventures, we consider such investments to include early (seed 
and start-up) and expansion stages in the ICT and BMH sector, leaving out all later stage private equity related 
investments. We then analyse the respective VC co-investment network in these two industries separately and 
compare them considering their different nature.  
During the observation period 1097 technology ventures received VC investments of which 92% took place after 
1998. This is reflective of a very slow growth of the VC market in the first one and a half decades of its existence. 
Despite strong government support, according to Lerner & Watson (2008) not all programs paid off as desired 
due to inappropriate tax incentives and inefficient regulatory regime. While the early government efforts failed to 
generate sufficient investment for technology related companies and young enterprises (Golis et al., 2010), later 
initiatives such as the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) program produced trained VC fund managers 
strengthening the market forces (Cumming, 2007). As the market matured, VC investment started to experience a 
relatively significant growth which can be explained by the gradual shift from dependence on government 
support to establishment of market forces. Since 1998, reportedly 646 companies received venture capital finance 
from 126 VC firms where 53 of them were corporate venture organizations and affiliates of financial institutions, 
62 were private equity firms raising finances independently from pension funds, endowment funds, angel and 
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Table 1. Venture related investment in Australia, 1980-2008 
Industry  Ventures 1980-2008 Ventures 1998-2008 




386 35.19% 361 35.64% 
Biotechnology, medical and 
healthcare (BMH) 
183 16.68% 173 17.08% 
Other 528 48.13% 479 47.29% 
Total 1097  1013  
 
3.2 Methodology  
For the empirical investigation to follow, we define syndication as two of more VC firms co-investing in a 
portfolio company at any point during the early and expansion stage which are also connected through 
representation on the board and shared objectives of developing the venture toward a successful exit. The first 
VC investor is considered to be the lead investor or initiator. If there are two or more investors co-investing in the 
first external round of financing at the same date as registered in the dataset, they all can be considered as lead 
initiators. The VC investors which join the initiator(s) in subsequent round/s are defined as followers. If a VC 
investor exits as another one enters, they are not considered as co-investors. Thus, we use the portfolio 
companies as the observation point and record the VC investment dates and investors’ profile to identify 
syndication. Graph theory is then applied to analyse the co-investment networks which are interpreted as graphs 
(Wasserman, 1994; Hanneman & Riddle 2005; Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The rationale for using 
graph theory is based on both its relevance and analytical versatilities for analysing business networks (Kildaff & 
Brass, 2003). The presentation of co-investments as nodes in the network graph first facilitates the users to 
visualize the network connectivity which allows the identifying of opportunities to enhance resource and 
information flows in the industry while closing the structural holes. Second, it allows the user to analyse the 
formation of each node by interpreting the characteristics of the participants. Graph theory helps represent and 
analyze connectivity between different players and is applicable to many real-world situations (Bondy & Murty, 
1982). 
Specifically, the co-investment networks of VC firms are analysed as affiliation networks where both, the 
portfolio companies and VC firms, are treated as nodes of the graph. The affiliation networks are 2-mode 
networks with only one set of actors and the second mode being a set of events in which the actors participate – 
the VC firms are the actors and the portfolio company in which they co-invest is the event. Hence, the actors are 
linked through participation in the same event. The companies where co-investments take place are the units of 
observation or the affiliation variables in the graph. All events are defined based on group of actors, not on pairs. 
Each affiliation therefore is defined as a subset of actors. The VC firms as actors form a tie or create a link with 
one another when they co-invest in the same company as an event. Consequently, the set of VC firms 
co-investing in a company forms the co-investment network.  




Specific codes are generated for each VC firm and portfolio company separately for the BMH and ICT industries. 
Two affiliation matrices are constructed for them in order to generate separate graphs for these industries. The 
summation of row elements of each matrix represents the number of co-investments by a VC firm and the 
summation of the column elements gives the number of investors in a company. Using these matrices, we 
generate the bipartite-affiliation matrices which provide an overview of the networks in a tabular form. The 
matrix is symmetric on both sides of the diagonal and the rows/columns show the ith VC firm’s co-investment 
number with jth VC firm. As at the diagonal points i=j, the diagonal elements of the matrix show the ith VC firm’s 
total number of co-investments indicating its network position. Then the affiliation networks are generated as a 
graph for each industry. The graph is defined on a set of nodes representing the VC firms and a set of links 
representing the co-investment ties. This also allows to identify the key players with higher co-investment ties 
and generate their ego-networks for further analysis.  
{1  i f  t h e  a c to r   i s  a f f i l i a t e d  w i th  th e  e v e n t    0  o th e rw i s e  i ji ja =
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4. Structural Analysis 
This section analyzes the structural characteristics of the Australian VC networks for the two industries based on 
their graphs. After examining the network structure, we focus on repeat syndication and other structural 
characteristics which are of particular interest in understanding how the VC industry operates, and finally we 
discuss how informative the Australian case is in respect to other economies. 
4.1 Network Structure  
The derived graphs of the VC firms’ co-investment networks in the ICT and BMH industry sectors are visually 
presented in Figure 1 and 2 respectively. All actor VC firms are shown as round dot nodes in the network and the 
portfolio companies which connect and affiliate with them are presented as square nodes. These affiliation 
network graphs thus not only show the links among the VC firms but also the shared portfolios. They allow the 
following properties of the networks to be observed. First, in both industries there is a peripheral spread of direct 
and indirect ties binding the actors in compact networks; nevertheless in both industries there are small fragments 
which are not connected with the larger networks. This means that we observe more VC actors who are 
well-connected but also some who are making less use of co-investment opportunities. Second, the networks are 
not particularly dense. This potentially leaves several structural holes restricting the flow of information and 
resources but also provides opportunities for creating bridges and enhancing the collaboration within the 
industries.  
As the graphs were generated using data about the Australian VC firms’ investments in technology ventures, they 
depict the specific characteristics of the Australian VC market. The networks of both ICT and BMH industries 
share a common feature, namely they concentrate around a few key players who exhibit a much higher degree of 
centrality compared to the others. Figure 3 specifically shows the network concentrations around the central 
players in each industry. There are four central players in the BMH sector: V15 – an independent private equity 
firm with $370 million under management specializing in the BMH since 1996; V25 – a government affiliated 
VC program operating since 1992 to support the growth of early stage bio-tech ventures; V33 – a financial 
institute affiliate investment vehicle with a focus on the BMH sector operating since 2004 and managing a 
relatively smaller size of capital; and V43 – a university affiliated program with a capital size of less than US$20 
million under management investing since 2000. The five central players in the ICT sector include four 
independent private equity firms and one financial institute affiliated investment vehicle: V5 – a very large 
financial institute affiliate firm managing around US$2 billion which has been in the market since 1987; V8 – 
one of the oldest market players since 1984 which manages around US$235 million; V38 and V19 – in the 
market since 1996 and 1998 respectively, and V29 – operating since 2001 which manages around US$116.8 
million with a central position in the network. Overall, the central players in the ICT network are relatively older 
and larger. This is partially because the ICT sector has been the key industry for VC investors before the BMH 
industries emerged as attractive opportunities. Government and university programs are still playing a key role in 
the BMH network contributing to the sector’s growth while this is not the case with ICT. It is realistic to expect 
that as other new technological sectors appear, such as those related to renewable energy and other environmental 
technologies, they will start attracting the attention of the VC sector but favourable conditions, such as 
government incentives, would need to be put in place for this to occur. 
 
Figure 1. Venture capital firms’ co-investment network in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare industry, 
Australia, 1980-2008 
Note. Red dot node – depicts an Australian venture capital firm; blue square node – depicts a venture capital portfolio company. 




Figure 2. Venture capital firms’ co-investment network in the information and communication technologies 
industry, Australia, 1980-2008 
Note. Red dot node – depicts an Australian venture capital firm; blue square node – depicts a venture capital portfolio company. 
 
Figure 3. Central venture capital players in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare (left) and information and 
communication technologies (right) industries, Australia, 1980-2008 
Note. Red dot node – depicts an Australian venture capital firm; blue square node – depicts a venture capital portfolio company. 
 
4.2 Repeat Syndication  
The literature on VC syndication has often looked at the rationale for syndication within a single period 
framework, whereas in some cases this can be better justified in a multi-period set-up. With the strength of ties 
between VC companies ranging from weak to strong, this can be measured by the frequency of communication 
and repeat co-investments over time. Each VC firm’s syndicated portfolio can be observed from the affiliation 
matrix. The co-investment networks show that there are several coherent subgroups which tend to continue 
syndicating investments in two or more portfolio companies. For simplicity, we identify subgroups in pairs of 
two VC firms co-investing in more than one company over time. For example, if two firms V1 and V2 co-invest 
in company C1 in period T1 and then in company C2 in period T2 and so on, they are considered forming a 
subgroup in the network through repeat co-investments. This repetition is most likely motivated by positive 
experiences and possibilities for working together in similar ventures. The findings on repeat co-investments are 







www.ccsenet.org/jms Journal of Management and Sustainability Vol. 6, No. 2; 2016 
28 
 
Table 2. Repeat venture capital co-investments in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare industry, Australia, 
1980-2008 
Frequency Number of Pairs Pair Description 
5 1 (V15, V34) 
4 1 (V15, V25) 
3 2 (V15, V31), (V33, V25) 
2 4 (V15, V33), (V21, V33), 
(V15, V7), (V15, V3) 
 
Table 3. Repeat venture capital co-investments in the information and communication technologies industry, 
Australia, 1980-2008 
Frequency Number of Pairs Pair Description 
4 1 (V202, V05) 
2 9 (V38, V34), (V19, V08), (V8, V29), (V13, V18), (V14, 
V61), (V19, V15), 
(V18, V29), (V29, V32), (V34, V29) 
 
In the BMH network (refer to Table 2), V15 has two regular co-investment partners, namely V34 and V25. While 
V15 is a large size independent private equity firm, V34 and V25 are relatively small specialized VC firms 
affiliated with university research and government support programs. The relationship can be based on 
complementarity of recourses and expertise. In the ICT network (refer to Table 3), there are fewer repeat 
co-investments while V202 and V5 have repeated co-investments in four portfolio companies—V5 is a financial 
institute affiliate VC firm with a size of capital under management close to US$2 billion while V202 is also a 
financial institute affiliate firm with a smaller size of capital but with specialization in the ICT sector. The 
relation can be based on complementarity of resources as well as compatibility of culture (Sarkar, Echambadi, 
Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001). This pair also shows that prior financial industry networks between the investors can 
lead to long-term relationships.  
There are several VC firms with no specific industry focus which have co-investment relationships with other 
VC firms in both the ICT and BMH networks. Within the observations dataset, 70.17% of the co-investments in 
the ICT networks were done among firms with the same industry preferences while the rest have a record of 
investing in BMH. Similarly, we observe that 50% of the co-investing in the BMH network was done by VC 
firms with preference for the same industry while the other 50% invest also in ICT industry. The VC firms which 
are investing across industries are either financial investors with no industry preference or firms with large 
management teams and multiple expertise.  
4.3 Other Structural Properties  
In the observation dataset, out of 121 BMH companies 27.27% received syndicated investments and out of 246 
ICT companies only 21.14% received syndicated investment. In the ICT sector, 70.17% of the VC firms 
syndicating investment specialize in this industry with the remaining syndicated investments being both in ICT 
and BHM. The average size of the syndicates in the BMH industry is 2.61 while it is 2.37 in ICT which shows a 
greater tendency to syndicate investments in the biomedical and health industry. The duration of syndicates 
however is short and the size of syndicates is small. This could pertain to the overall size and maturity of the 
Australian venture capital market.  
The duration of the co-investment relationship is often limited to a few rounds. Figure 4 shows that in the ICT 
network most syndication is done for one round and only a very few co-investment relationships go beyond three 
rounds. One possible explanation is that the VC firms tend not to invest in very early stages with a longer 
investment horizon. This is consistent with the nature of investing by VC companies as many of them are private 
equity firms or financial institute affiliate vehicles. The pattern is similar in the BMH network although most VC 
firms there tend to maintain syndication relationships for two or more rounds. This network represents a larger 
variety of investors with different strategic orientations. The size of the syndicates is fairly small and in both 
networks the majority of syndicates are formed by only two VC firms as shown in Figure 5. Similarly, in both 
industries most VC firms participated in a syndication only once and a very few more than three times (as shown 
in Figure 6). Thus, the level of networking is yet to intensify which could in turn increase the density of network 
ties.  




Figure 4. Duration of syndication by number of rounds in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare (BMH) and 
information and communication technologies (ICT) industries, Australia, 1980-2008 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of venture capital firms per venture in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare (BMH) and 
information and communication technologies (ICT) industries, Australia, 1980-2008 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of syndicate participation by venture capital firms in the biotechnology, medical and healthcare 
(BMH) and information and communication technologies (ICT) industries, Australia, 1980-2008 
 
4.4 Australian Findings 
Networks are a platform for change and the Australian example with the two high-tech industries shows a 
particular case of risk minimization, flow of information, syndication, repeat investment and other characteristics 
of the VC industry. Compared to other developed parts of the world, such as USA and Europe, the Australian 
venture capital industry is much younger and smaller not only in terms of the number of operating firms but also 
with respect to the size of VC funds available for investing.  
Although each national VC sector is unique and highly influenced by the environment in which it operated, 
including government regulations, the methodological approach taken in this study is universally applicable. The 
graph theory allows to illustrate the structural characteristics of the VC industry, describe its properties, identify 
the main players and analyze the main vehicles for investment, including syndication and repeat co-investment. 
It can also be used to shed light on opportunities for building further potential and facilitating information flows 
and resource utilization. 
They graph theory analysis also shows that there is a network momentum which means that once some VC firms 
start investing in particular technologies, others are likely to follow encouraged by syndication and co-investent. 
This expands the size of the new industry and improves the chances for technological innovation. This network 
property is important for any emerging new areas, such as companies interested in and motivated by 
sustainability priorities. The section to follow explores further the behavioural and sustainability implications of 
VC networks. 
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5. Behavioural Implications and Sustainability  
The above graphs visualize well several structural properties of the networks, including connectivity and density. 
In a dense network, the flow of information becomes more fluid and the available formations become more 
homogeneous (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). A straightforward observation is that the derived networks for the 
Australian BMH and ICT sectors are not dense and there is scope for increased connectivity which can optimize 
the flow of information and resources in each network. Other structural properties, such as the size of syndicates, 
length of syndication relationships, coherent subgroups involved in repeat syndication and characteristics of the 
central players in each network, shed further light on the socio-behavioural elements within the Australian VC 
market. The perceived economic benefit of inter-firm networking in the VC industry is captured in terms of 
contribution to successful divestment of portfolio companies and increased internal rate of return (IRR) on 
investments (Jaaskelainen, 2012), although the management of syndicated portfolio entails additional transaction 
cost and potential complications (Wright & locket, 2003).  
While the syndication relationships are initially formed with the aim of maximizing the risk-adjusted financial 
returns, social variables like trust and reputation play an important part in selecting co-investment partners which 
in turn may affect the financial performance (Tykvova, 2007; Casamatta & Hritchabalet, 2007; Fachrunnisa, 
2012; Nahata, 2008). The network also requires maintaining the relation and reputation which is critical for 
creating and transforming value within firms (Madhock & Tallman, 1998). Thus, co-investment relationships and 
network participation become a source of relational and social capital in the industry and this has two broad 
socio-behavioural implications, especially for their viability. First, the network not only serves as a forum for 
exchanging information and resources but also as a platform for shaping industry practices and culture. Second, 
the industry networks become a basis for interacting with other institutions. This can lead to greater collaboration 
within industries, communities and governments essential for a balanced economic and socio-environmental 
development.  
In the high-risk environment of the VC industry, equity syndication emerges as one of the most common 
practices. Nonetheless, the approach to risk management especially in the financial industry has become more 
homogeneous and instrumental over the years while ignoring or underestimating the behavioural risk 
(Roeschmann, 2014). Meanwhile in recent decades, speculative behaviour, aggressive attitude and short-term 
orientation have emerged as a new culture in the financial industry (Chappe, Semmler, & Nell, 2013). This has 
severely destabilized the VC industry, particularly in relation to events such as the global financial crisis (Block 
& Sandner, 2009). In response, there have been calls for changing the culture of risk and relevant industry 
practices.  
At the same time, there has been a growing demand for sustainable and responsible investments which require 
the VC firms to be more vigilant about the environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk and opportunities 
(Christofi, Christofi, & Sisaye, 2012). However, such changes require industry–wide coordination where 
networks can be the suitable forum for discussion and transmission of information (Wasserman, 1994; Mizruchi, 
1992) and thus become a platform for the transformation of the industry practices and culture. There is growing 
evidence that industries are developing codes to address external problems and industry associations can work on 
developing appropriate ESG and sustainability programs (Paton, 2006; Strandberg Consulting, 2013).  
Working alone cannot solve many of the complex problems while networking can initiate partnerships and 
collaboration. This has been recognized as a way to achieve sustainability, although a wider inter-sectoral 
collaboration between government, industry and community is often called for (Pezzey, 1992; Paton, 2006; 
Petzel, 2010; Dienhart, 2010). Such a multi-sector collaboration can be more comprehensible and meaningful 
when some semi-formal or informal industry governance exists in the form of industry associations or equity 
alliance networks which represent actual investment interest and practices. Resource dependence and social 
network theory are useful in understanding cross-sectoral collaboration as much as inter-firm collaboration 
(Nielson & Thomsen, 2011). Any sustainability norms and standards must take shape within the industry sectors 
in order to achieve effective cross-sectoral collaborations.  
Our data reveals that government, banks, corporations and universities formed different investment vehicles 
beside traditional private equity funds to invest in young and prospective technology companies in Australia. In 
the BMH network the central players represent independent private equity firms, government and university 
programs as well as affiliates of financial institutes. This further reveals that the intricacy of cross-sectoral 
collaboration is embedded within the VC syndication industry network. Similar collaboration and initiatives by 
government and industry stakeholders in the future could lead to the next wave of innovation especially in the 
emerging area of clean technologies. Although still remaining substantially small, environmental technologies are 
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likely to be a significant industry sector for future VC investors (AVCAL, 2009; Australian Cleantech, 2015). 
This is consistent with the global growth in renewable technologies which increased from US$ 45.1 billion in 
2004 to US$ 270.2 billion in 2014 (UNEP, 2015). It is important to understand that the institutions and culture of 
the country strongly influence the development of the VC industry in the long run (Cumming, 2007; Nahata et al., 
2014).  
6. Conclusion  
Using graph theory, this study set up to analyse the structural and behavioural characteristics of the Australian 
VC sector for the first 25 years of its existence. The findings show that firms are simultaneously competing and 
collaborating with others in an industry which expands the traditional frontiers of strategies. This allows them to 
address emerging challenges and opportunities resulting primarily from rapid changes in technological 
possibilities and growing integration in the global market space. The VC industry has been at the forefront of 
technological innovation in both, ICT and BMH, and is likely to have a similar catalytic role for any upcoming 
new industries, such as those related to sustainability imperatives. Globalization and thereby collaboration among 
VC firms are co-evolving with the market. Syndication in particular is a visible, tangible and measurable form of 
inter-firm collaboration in the VC industry which has also emerged as a standard industry practice. The industry 
structure is the outcome of activities and relationships between firms leading to continuous interaction between 
network and industry structures.  
This structural analysis of the VC syndication network in Australia has several behavioural and policy 
implications for the industry and academia. Network structure based on graph theory can be used for 
understanding the extent of market integration and intensity of resource flows. It revealed several areas where the 
connectivity among firms could develop further and this can be facilitated by initiatives from industry 
practitioners as well as by targeted public policy. While such structural issues are more specific to Australia, the 
behavioural implications of the network analysis in this paper can be used across the market. The industry must 
co-evolve with the socio-environmental changes to stay resilient, viable and powerful in facilitating innovation. 
However, further research and investigation through networks are needed in the future to operationalize the 
changes in industry practices and culture in order to understand how it responds not only to financial 
opportunitites but also to new environmental, social and governance priorities.  
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